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3 Nonstandard Indicators for 
Monetary Policy: Can Their 
Usefulness Be Judged from 
Forecasting Regressions? 
Michael Woodford 
In recent years there has been a great deal of interest in proposals to use non- 
standard indicator variables as a guide to the conduct of monetary policy. By 
nonstandard indicators I mean indicators other than the various measures of 
the money supply that the Federal Reserve System computes, and to which 
academic economists in the monetarist tradition have long directed their atten- 
tion, and other than the variables that can be more or less directly controlled 
by the Fed, such as borrowed and nonborrowed reserves or the federal funds 
rate, and measures of the Fed’s success at achieving its ultimate objectives, 
such as measures of inflation and economic activity in the recent past. 
Some of the new indicators that have been discussed include commodity 
price indexes, nominal exchange rates, and spreads between the interest yields 
on longer- and shorter-maturity Treasury securities. Interest in the new indica- 
tors seems mainly to have been a response to the perceived instability in the 
1980s of the relations between traditional monetary aggregates and nominal 
aggregate demand. The various new proposals just mentioned all represent 
variations upon the idea that a desirable monetary policy, that would be able to 
respond to, and counteract, incipient inflationary pressures before much infla- 
tion had developed, could be conducted by monitoring various indicators that 
are known to be valuable as forecasts offuture inflation, rather than by giving 
one’s sole attention to the evolution of variables such as the money supply that 
are thought to be proximate causes of inflation. 
I do not attempt here to evaluate the likely consequences of any of these 
specific proposals. Instead, the present note addresses a general issue raised by 
proposals of this general type, that of how to determine which variables, of all 
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the many types of data available to the Fed, are reasonable indicators to use as 
the basis for a feedback rule for one or another instrument of monetary policy. 
The discussion of the new indicators has tended to assume that one should 
simply look for any or all available variables that have proved to be useful in 
forecasting inflation over some relevant horizon. The advocates of the new 
variables within the Federal Reserve System have stressed their usefulness as 
leading indicators of inflation, and much of the academic commentary has 
addressed itself to formal econometric evaluation of their forecasting abil- 
ity, typically within a completely atheoretical vector autoregression (VAR) 
framework. 
The question I consider here is whether analysis of this sort is a sufficient 
ground for choosing variables to be used in making monetary policy. I will 
argue that such investigations are no substitute for an analysis of the conse- 
quences of making policy on the basis of one indicator or another in the context 
of a specific structural model of the economy, which models both the determi- 
nation of the indicator in question and the effects of possible monetary policy 
interventions. Before developing this point further, however, I first review from 
a purely statistical point of view the literature that has addressed the issue. 
3.1 Econometric Evaluations of the Usefulness of Commodity Prices as 
an Indicator 
The type of nonstandard indicator most often discussed has been one index 
or another of commodity prices. The recent interest in commodities prices 
began with the revival of interest among “supply-side economists,” during the 
first Reagan administration, in the stabilization of commodities prices (includ- 
ing, perhaps, a return to a gold standard) as a goal of monetary policy, as an 
alternative to the monetarist program of controlling the growth rate of a mone- 
tary aggregate. For example, Reynolds (1982) advocated stabilizing spot com- 
modity prices, especially the price of gold. Miles (1984) discussed a variety of 
possible types of “price rules,” including the stabilization of the spot prices of 
gold or other commodities, eventually coming down in favor of a rule that 
would involve stabilization of commodity futures prices, as well as stabiliza- 
tion of long-term bond yields. Others argued for the use of commodity prices 
as an indicator if not as a target variable; for example, Genetski (1982) argued 
for making the range of permissible growth rates for the monetary base change 
automatically in response to movements of a commodity price index. These 
proposals received some attention among policymakers, especially in 1982, 
when the United States suffered from a severe recession that was widely attrib- 
uted to the Fed’s attempt to bring money growth under control. At that time, 
Representatives Jack Kemp and Trent Lott introduced into Congress the Bal- 
anced Monetary Policy and Price Stability Act, which would have required the 
Fed to pursue “price stability” over all other objectives, with price stability to 
be measured by one of two possible indexes of commodity prices. While the 
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primary goal of such measures was obviously stability of the general price 
level, some proponents also argued that basing monetary policy on commodi- 
ties prices would stabilize interest rates and economic activity as well; Gen- 
etski (1982) argued that such a rule would have enabled the United States to 
avoid all major recessions since 1915. 
Proposals to actually stabilize commodities prices soon fell out of favor, in 
the face of skepticism about the feasibility of commodity price stabilization by 
the Fed (see, e.g., Hafer 1983), and about whether stabilization of commodities 
prices would in fact imply stability of prices more generally. Because of the 
high volatility of gold and other commodity prices, relative to the volatility of 
general price indexes like the consumer price index (CPI), many argued that 
commodities prices evidently move in response to many factors other than the 
true current stance of monetary policy-not only factors affecting the supply 
of and demand for individual commodities, which ought to affect their relative 
prices, but incorrect perceptions perhaps on the part of market participants 
about what the current policy stance is-so that the concern with stabilizing 
these particular prices might actually make monetary policy, and prices gener- 
ally, more volatile. (See, e.g., Bordo testimony in U.S. House 1987 and 
DeFina 1988.) 
Nonetheless, in the late 1980s commodity prices were again widely dis- 
cussed as a desirable basis for monetary policy, this time within the Federal 
Reserve itself, and this time with an emphasis on their usefulness as indicators 
of inflationary pressures, rather than as a target variable. Federal Reserve gov- 
ernor Wayne D. Angel1 ( 1  987) proposed that a commodity price guide be used 
to adjust short-run money-growth target ranges, and Governor H. Robert 
Heller (1987) endorsed such a rule as a way of bringing about not only domes- 
tic price stability, but greater exchange-rate stability as well. Vice Chairman 
Manuel H. Johnson (1988) suggested that not only commodity prices, but 
interest-rate spreads and nominal exchange rates, should serve as information 
variables to evaluate the current stance of monetary policy. The general idea 
behind these proposals is clearly expressed by Johnson: “Changes in monetary 
policy should be reflected in these financial auction market prices well before 
they affect the broader price measures. Thus, there is reason to believe that 
they may give advance warning of impending change for important concerns 
such as inflation.” A similar idea lies behind the more recent proposal by Rob- 
ert Hetzel(l990, 1992) that the Fed create a market for a new type of financial 
instrument, an indexed bond, so that the spread between the yield on this bond 
and the yield on a nominal bond of similar maturity can be used as an indicator 
of inflationary expectations, and hence as a guide to monetary policy.’ 
This second generation of proposals for the use of nonstandard indicators is 
1. Goodfriend (1993), in an account of the actual conduct of Fed policy during the 1980s. argues 
that the term stmcture has in fact been an important source of information about inflationary ex- 
pectations and an important determinant of changes in the stance of monetary policy. 
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explicitly based upon the statistical claim that these variables serve as leading 
indicators of inflation; for example, Angel1 (1987) presented evidence that over 
a long historical period peaks and troughs in indexes of commodity prices 
have preceded peaks and troughs in consumer price inflation. As a result, a 
considerable scholarly literature evaluating these proposals has given particu- 
lar attention to econometric tests of the extent to which the proposed indicator 
variables do in fact forecast inflation-generally in a completely atheoretical 
way.2 
Several types of econometric analyses of the relation between commodity 
prices and inflation have been ~ndertaken.~ One popular test examines the coin- 
tegration of commodity price indexes with general price indexes such as the 
CPI. For example, Garner (1989) tests for cointegration between several com- 
modity price indexes and the CPI, and concludes that none are cointegrated 
with it. That is, not only is the real price of commodities (the commodity price 
index deflated by the CPI) a nonstationary variable, but no linear combination 
of the logarithms of the two price indexes is found to be a stationary variable, 
so that independent factors evidently determine the long-run behavior of the 
two series. He argues on this ground that commodity prices are not useful as 
an intermediate target for monetary policy, as stabilization of commodity 
prices would not imply stabilization of consumer prices. Sephton (1991) ex- 
tends the cointegration analysis and confirms Garner’s conclusions. Baillie 
(1989) reports similar results and draws a similar conclusion. Boughton and 
Branson (1991) test for cointegration between various commodity price in- 
dexes and an aggregate of consumer prices in seven industrial countries, and 
also find no cointegration. 
On the other hand, a number of authors have pointed out that the fact that 
commodity prices and consumer prices do not move together in the long run 
does not exclude commodity prices from playing a useful role in improving 
forecasts of consumer price inflation. Garner tests for Granger causality of CPI 
inflation by several commodity price indexes, and finds that a null hypothesis 
of no causality can be statistically rejected; that is, that future CPI inflation can 
be somewhat better forecasted when the commodity price series is included in 
one’s vector autoregression, than when that variable is excluded. He also uses 
his (nonstructural) VAR model to decompose the variance in CPI inflation into 
2. An exception is the study of Cody and Mills (1990), which uses a “structural” vector autore- 
gression approach. I do not discuss this study here, as an evaluation of the particular identifying 
assumptions proposed by Cody and Mills is beyond the scope of this note. A number of authors 
have also sought to evaluate the usefulness of nonstandard indicators through policy simulations 
in the context of structural models, as I advocate here. See, e.g., Fuhrer and Moore (1992), Porter 
(1990). and Brayton and Tinsley (1991). 
3. I emphasize the literature on commodity prices here, because this literature is explicitly moti- 
vated by the monetary policy proposals just mentioned. A considerable literature has also exam- 
ined the relation between the term structure and inflation, for example, but this literature is not 
primarily motivated by the suggestion that the term structure should be a guide to monetary policy; 
on the whole, it seeks rather to test particular theories of the term structure that emphasize varia- 
tions in inflationary expectations as a source of changes in the term structure. 
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fractions attributable to innovations in each of the several variables included 
in the regression, and concludes that innovations in a commodity price index 
“explain about 25% of the prediction error variance for the CPI after 48 
months,” even when the monetary base is included in the VAR as another of 
the forecasting variables. As a result, he concludes that “the empirical evidence 
suggests that an index of commodity prices may be a useful information vari- 
able for policymakers,” though he argues that it is not a suitable intermediate 
target because of the absence of cointegration. Sephton confirms the results of 
Garner with respect to Granger causality as well. Whitt (1988) similarly finds 
that commodity prices significantly improve forecasts of inflation. 
On the other hand, a number of authors have criticized the conclusion from 
a finding of Granger causality alone that commodity prices are useful indica- 
tors for monetary policy. Webb (1988) finds that a commodity price index en- 
ters significantly in forecasting regressions for inflation, but that the magnitude 
of the improvement in forecastability is very small. He therefore concludes: 
“That commodity prices added a small amount of predictive power suggests 
that a small improvement in anti-inflation policy could be achieved by using 
them as an indicator variable.” Aguais, DeAngelis, and Wyss (1988) find that 
commodity prices provide little additional information about future inflation, 
once wages and measures of supply conditions are also included as regressors, 
and Baillie (1 989) and Barsky (1993) report similar results. Boughton and 
Branson (1991), in their study of the relation between commodity prices and 
industrial-country inflation, also report a finding of Granger causality. How- 
ever, they find that while including the commodity price index in their VAR 
substantially improves the within-sample fit of their model of inflation, it re- 
sults in no improvement in post-sample inflation forecasts. They thus conclude 
that “the quantitative linkages between commodity and consumer prices are 
significant, but are not stable enough to permit one to draw quantitative infer- 
ences about the extent to which consumer prices might respond to a given 
change in commodity prices.” 
I do not propose here to settle the issue of the nature of the statistical rela- 
tionship between commodity prices and inflation, but rather to address an issue 
of method raised by this literature, and by studies such as that of Barsky (1993) 
that appraise other proposed indicator variables using similar methods. This is 
the question of whether a simple measurement of the extent to which an indica- 
tor has been associated in the past with subsequent inflation-even supposing 
that purely statistical issues such as the stability of the relationship over time 
can be satisfactorily addressed-suffices to determine the appropriate use that 
should be made of such an indicator in the formulation of monetary policy. 
To be sure, careful econometric analysis of the extent to which a given indi- 
cator does in fact forecast inflation provides a better basis for policy discus- 
sions than mere impressions gleaned from the financial press. Some of the 
early enthusiasts of a monetary policy rule based on commodity prices seemed 
to think that the mere fact that commodity prices are observed to be volatile 
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suggests their importance as a source of inf~rmation,~ and certainly regression 
analysis quickly exposes the fallacy in such reasoning. Still, the econometric 
literature often seems to regard as obvious the fact that policy rules can be 
directly formulated on the basis of the kinds of nonstructural regression rela- 
tionships that are estimated. Even when the authors are critical of the proposed 
policy rules, they write as if it would make sense to stabilize commodity prices 
if they were found to be cointegrated with the CPI, or to adjust the stance of 
monetary policy in response to a commodity price index if its marginal fore- 
casting power were found to be larger than it happens to be in the data exam- 
ined. This is what I wish to challenge. 
It might seem that shifting the terms of the discussion of desirable indicators 
for monetary policy, from consideration of what causes inflation to a simple 
consideration of how to forecast it, would have great advantages. One might 
argue that the monetarist case for tracking the money supply was based upon 
an assertion that money growth forecasts future inflation; however appealing 
the theoretical case for such a link, one can test econometrically whether other 
variables might not allow inflation to be forecasted even more accurately, and 
if so, it might seem that one should base monetary policy upon those other 
variables instead. Furthermore, it is a more straightforward matter to settle 
which variables have had what degree of forecasting power than to show con- 
clusively that certain causal mechanisms have been operative. 
I wish to argue that these advantages are more illusory than real. Despite the 
greater difficulty of deciding what a correctly specified structural model for 
the analysis of the effects of monetary policy should look like, we have no 
alternative but to undertake such an inquiry. In particular, supposing that one 
finds that a particular indicator has been reliably associated with subsequent 
inflation, I wish to argue that it matters a great deal whether the association 
exists because (a )  the indicator is itself a measure of, or is directly influenced 
by, the underlying causes of inflation, and will indicate those inflationary pres- 
sures regardless of whether market participants understand them and regard- 
less of whether the inflation is in fact allowed to develop; or (b) the indicator 
is influenced by market participants’ expectations of inflation, and so responds 
to the underlying causes of inflation, but only insofar as market participants 
are aware of them and actually expect inflation to result. The basic idea behind 
the interest in nonstandard indicators has been a suggestion that indicators that 
work for the second reason are actually the better guides for monetary policy; 
but I wish to argue exactly the opposite. 
There are several reasons why a conclusion about the right type of feedback 
rule for monetary policy on the basis of atheoretical forecasting regressions 
alone can be highly misleading. I take them up in sequence. 
4. For example, Reynolds (1982) stresses the importance of controlling a “sensitive measure of 
price,” and writes: “Since broader price indexes are too insensitive, what about narrowing the list 
to only one commodity-namely, gold-that is notoriously sensitive to every whiff of inflation 
or deflation?” 
101 Nonstandard Indicators for Monetary Policy 
3.2 Low Forecasting Power May Not Justify Ignoring an Indicator 
First, the mere fact that an indicator is found not to enter significantly in an 
inflation forecasting regression does not necessarily mean that the Fed should 
be advised not to pay any attention to that variable. For the absence of forecast- 
ing power might simply mean that the variable is already being used by the 
Fed in making policy, and in approximately the right way, from the point of 
view of minimizing the variability of inflation. 
The point can be illustrated by the following extremely stylized model. Sup- 
pose that inflation over the relevant horizon is determined by a relation of the 
form 
(1) 
where V, is inflation between dates t and t + 1 ,  s, is an indicator observed at 
date t ,  u, is a control variable of the monetary authority chosen at date t ,  and 
E , , ~  is a mean-zero random variable not forecastable at date t. Equation ( 1  j is 
intended to represent a causal effect of u, on the probability distribution of 
possible values for v,+~ which is understood by the monetary authority; for 
simplicity, this effect is assumed to be a simple shift in the conditional mean, 
and the size of the effect is assumed to be independent of the value of s, that is 
observed. The appearance of s, on the right-hand side of (1) need not have a 
causal interpretation; s, may simply be correlated with factors that influence 
inflation independently of the control variable. The realizations of s, and E , , ~  
are assumed to be independent of the choice of u,, and the realization of E , + ~  
likewise independent of s,. 
It follows that the variance of T , + ~  is minimized by a policy feedback rule 
of the form u, = -st. If such a rule is followed, mrtl = and a regression 
of T,+~ on s, will yield (asymptotically) a zero coefficient. But it would be 
incorrect in such a case to tell the monetary authority to stop monitoring the 
value of s, before choosing the value of u,. Since many of the indicators the 
recent literature is concerned with have been argued to be useful by officers of 
the Fed, one can hardly be certain that the Fed’s policy actions during the 
period from which one’s data are drawn did not respond to these variables; and 
in fact Goodfriend (1993) argues that Fed policy for at least the last decade 
has been guided to a great extent by the movements of an interest-rate spread. 
Hence the finding of low incremental forecasting power for some of these vari- 
ables might be due to the way in which they are already being used. Without 
an attempt to understand the data in terms of a structural model (which would 
include a model of the Fed’s policy rule), it is hard to reach a conclusion 
about this. 
One might argue that in any event a finding of insignificant forecasting 
power for a given indicator allows one to make the recommendation that policy 
should respond to that variable to exactly the extent that it already does- 
neither more nor less. But this is not a particularly useful sort of recommenda- 
V,+I = s, + u, + & , + I (  
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tion. In the absence of a determination of what the Fed’s current policy rule is 
(or has been in the period under study), it would not be clear what sort of 
response had been shown to be desirable. (The Fed itself might not know what 
it would mean to “maintain the status quo”; would a new Board member be 
required to adopt the opinions of whatever member he or she had just replaced 
in order to maintain some balance of forces?) Also, if one were recommending 
that some indicators could be used to reduce inflation variability relative to 
past policies, it would not be clear that the optimal response to the other vari- 
able (that is believed to have been used optimally in the past) would be un- 
changed if the use of the former variables were changed. 
3.3 Pitfalls in Basing Policy upon Indicators That Have Forecasted 
Inflation in the Past 
On the other hand, the mere fact that an indicator is found to be useful in 
forecasting inflation does not tell much about the desirability of a policy that 
involves feedback from that indicator. There are several reasons why such an 
inference requires caution. One is that the ability of the indicator to signal the 
underlying sources of inflationary pressures that one wants to respond to may 
be impaired by the very fact that the monetary authority responds to it. 
This point is, of course, simply a variant of the by now familiar Lucas (1976) 
critique of econometric policy evaluation. The Lucas critique is perhaps some- 
times invoked in too sweeping a way, to discredit all attempts at econometric 
policy evaluation as such (an issue to which I return below). However, the point 
seems particularly likely to be an important one in the present context. This is 
because the nontraditional indicators with which the recent literature is con- 
cerned are clearly not believed to be useful for forecasting inflation because of 
being causal determinants of inflation. In fact, they are not even believed to be 
proxies for such causal determinants (because, say, of a direct causal effect of 
the underlying sources of inflationary pressure on the indicators); instead, they 
are believed to be of interest because of being strongly affected by (and hence 
signaling) the state of inflationary expectations. But if the connection between 
the underlying sources of inflationary pressure (that one wishes to respond to) 
and the indicator is mediated primarily by expectations, one is in the situation 
where it is most plausible that the relation should radically change in the case 
of a policy intervention that modifies the relation between the underlying states 
and the inflation that eventually occurs. 
The point may be illustrated by a simple example. (This admittedly has not 
been proposed by any of the advocates of nonstandard indicators, but is in the 
spirit of some of those proposals.) If the best indicator for monetary policy is 
simply the variable that best forecasts future inflation, why not simply use 
published inflation forecasts as the basis for policy? I expect that if one were 
to include among the regressors some kind of consensus forecast of inflation 
in forecasting regressions like those in Barsky (1993), one would find not only 
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that it had marginal significance, but that there was little marginal significance 
for the other variables once the forecast was included in the regression. 
But should the Fed then be advised to simply respond to the current consen- 
sus forecast of inflation, to the exclusion of all other available information? 
Such a proposal could have paradoxical effects. The use of the forecasts in 
setting policy would change the relation between the forecasters’ information 
variables and inflation, and so would lead them to change the way they form 
their forecasts. But once they did, the relation between their forecasts and the 
underlying sources of inflationary pressure would change, so that the Fed’s 
optimal response to the forecast would change. And if the Fed changes its 
response, as it ought to, this again changes the way in which forecasters ought 
to form their forecasts. This process of adjustment between the two sides need 
not admit any equilibrium. 
A simple example shows why. Let (1) again describe the determination of 
inflation, but now suppose that the variable s, is not observed by the monetary 
authority. Instead, suppose that s, is observed by a private forecaster, and that 
the authority observes the forecastf,. Finally, suppose that the forecaster seeks 
to minimize the expected squared forecast error (T, ,~  - A)’. It follows thatf, 
will equal the conditional expectation of T,+,, given the forecaster’s observa- 
tion of s,. If the monetary authority uses a feedback rule of the form 
then optimal use of the forecaster’s information requires that the forecast be 
(3) f, = as,, 
where a = a@) = ( 1  + On the other hand, if the forecaster uses any rule 
of the form (3), the monetary authority’s optimal feedback rule (in order to 
minimize the variance of T,+~, given its observation off, but not of sI) is of the 
form ( 2 ) ,  where A = A(a) = a-I. However, the curves a = a(A) and A = A(a) 
never intersect, for any values of a and A.5 
This result is reminiscent, of course, of the celebrated Grossman-Stiglitz 
paradox, according to which traders in financial markets cannot use private 
information about the future value of assets being traded to earn higher returns, 
because their trade on the basis of the information should cause the market 
price to reflect the information, so that they should have no informational ad- 
vantage over other traders. This result is often viewed as posing an analytical 
challenge for theorists (to explain why the result is not true despite its appeal- 
5. Bob Hall and Greg Mankiw (chap. 2 in this volume) suggest, in the context of a different 
assumed objective of monetary policy, that the minimization of the variance of a variable should 
be achieved by eliminating variation in the consensus forecast of that variable. Furthermore, they 
argue that it should be possible for the Fed to eliminate variation in the consensus forecast by an 
appropriate choice of policy, given timely information about the forecast. But in the present model, 
this is not possible. “Pegging the forecast” would mean choosing a policy rule that induces fore- 
casters to choose a = 0, but there is no choice of A that achieves this. Thus the possibility of such 
an objective for the Fed depends upon details of the economy’s information structure. 
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ing logic) rather than a problem for traders who expend effort in learning about 
companies whose shares are publicly traded; for it seems obvious that traders 
with superior information can make money from it (some who trade on the 
basis of “inside information” are sent to jail for it), whether our models can 
explain it or not. I do not think the result just presented is of the same kind. In 
the case of the Grossman-Stiglitz analysis, it is a rather subtle consequence of 
a specific model of market equilibrium that the market price should fully reveal 
the private information of the informed traders; and one can avoid this conclu- 
sion in various ways, for example, by assuming the presence of “liquidity trad- 
ers.’’ One may well suppose that in reality there is not full revelation, and this 
resolves the paradoxical features of their analysis. In the present case, there is 
no similar reason to doubt the assumption that the informed agents’ forecasts 
are fully revealed to the monetary authority. First of all, the forecasters can 
make use of their superior information only insofar as they make their fore- 
casts public-they have no motive to allow only a “noisy” report of their fore- 
casts to become known. But more important, the policy proposal above is 
premised upon the authority’s ability to observe the private forecasts; there is 
plainly no possibility of following such a rule if the private forecasters seek to 
and are able to keep their forecasts confidential. 
Of course it is still possible, under the circumstances described above, for 
the monetary authority to reduce the variability of inflation to a great degree 
by choosing a very large value for A. But this is hardly an attractive method. 
(It gives the forecaster extreme power over the economy, on the understanding 
that it will not be rational for him to use it.) If the monetary authority could 
observe s, as well asJ, it is plainly more desirable for the authority to choose 
a rule involving feedback from s, (ideally, u, = -s,) than any rule of the form 
(2). Yet this fact would not be revealed by a simple consideration of the relative 
forecasting power of the variables s, andJ for inflation; for the two variables 
would be perfectly correlated (as long as forecasters use a rule of the form 
[3]), and neither would enter a forecasting regression with a more significant 
coefficient than the other. 
A second pitfall in basing policy upon an indicator variable simply because 
it is found to enter significantly in forecasting regressions is that monetary 
policy interventions may affect the determination of the indicator, in such a 
way as to create a feedback loop from policy to the indicator back to policy 
that results in policy instability (and hence inflation instability as well). An 
absurd policy proposal serves to illustrate this. One variable that has been 
shown to forecast inflation is the return on Treasury bills (Fama 1975). A con- 
trol variable that the Fed frequently uses to respond to changes in the perceived 
threat of inflation is the Federal funds rate. Would it then be a reasonable policy 
proposal to direct the Fed to raise the funds rate whenever higher than average 
T-bill yields are observed? Of course no one would propose this. But this is 
because of additional structural information that we have about the determina- 
tion of these variables; specifically, we know that when the Fed raises the funds 
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rate, T-bill yields rise as a result. It is because of this that we would expect the 
proposed rule to create instability. This illustrates the general point that an 
evaluation of policy rules must be based upon a structural model, both of the 
determination of the indicator variables and of the effects of monetary policy. 
This example, while drawn as a caricature to make the point simply, is not 
without relevance to recent proposals for the use of nonstandard indicators. 
One proposal is to raise short-term interest rates whenever a long-term bond 
rate rises.b Now the connection between the funds rate and long-term rates is 
not as transparent as in the case of the previous absurd proposal. But still, 
according to the expectations theory of the term structure, the expectation that 
short rates will remain high makes long-term rates high. This raises the possi- 
bility that a disturbance to the long-term bond rate could trigger a policy shift 
whose effects on long-term rates would justify continuation of the policy, keep- 
ing long-term rates high, and so on.’ 
3.4 Feedback from Inflation Indicators Can Create Instability due to 
Self-Fulfilling Expectations 
A further pitfall is the possibility of creating, through the monetary policy 
rule, a feedback loop that allows arbitrary changes in expectations to become 
self-fulfilling. This possibility again is one that can be evaluated only in the 
context of a structural model. It seems, however, particularly likely to be a 
problem in the case of rules that create feedback to policy from indicators that 
are themselves very sensitive to expectations. Thus an approach to the selec- 
tion of policy rules that simply emphasizes the use of indicators with good 
forecasting power may direct attention to precisely the kind of policy rules that 
are most likely to create feedback loops that allow expectations to become 
self-fulfilling. 
The following provides a simple example of a policy rule that might appear 
desirable, based upon the correlations that would be observed prior to the intro- 
duction of feedback from the indicator, but that would make possible “sunspot 
equilibria” (in some of which the variability of inflation would be higher than 
in the equilibrium that exists in the absence of feedback). The analysis is based 
upon an IS-LM model with rational expectations. Let output and nominal in- 
terest rates be determined by log-linear equations of the familiar sort: 
(4) 
(5  1 
Here m, is the log of the money supply, p ,  the log of the price level, yr the log 
of output, and i, the nominal interest rate; I assume that y > 0 and that 0 < 6 
mr - P, = Yr - Yir + ~ m r  
Y ,  = -Wi, - (ErPr+, - PJI. 
6. This is the policy that Goodfriend (1993) describes the Fed as having actually followed. 
7. This is, I believe, essentially the reason for the negative conclusion of Fuhrer and Moore 
(1992) regarding the consequences of feedback rules of this type. 
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< 1.8 To eliminate constants from the equations, units are chosen so that in the 
steady state equilibrium with a constant money supply and no disturbance, y = 
0, i = 0, and m = p.  (Thus y ,  should be interpreted as the percentage deviation 
of output from its “natural” level.) The price level p ,  is assumed to be chosen 
at date t - 1, in such a way that9 
The disturbance term in (4) represents stochastic variation in money de- 
mand. I Gssume that E,,, follows a random walk (independent of monetary pol- 
icy), whose increments A&,,,, are bounded mean-zero random variables, and 
that it is not observed by the monetary authority. It is this source of inflationary 
pressure for which the authority would like to find an indicator. I consider this 
particular type of disturbance because the recent discussion of nonstandard 
indicators seems to have been largely a response to the perceived instability of 
the demand for familiar monetary aggregates during the 1980s. 
Consider first a policy regime in which the money supply is constant. (We 
may without loss of generality suppose that m, = 0 for all t . )  In this case, there 
is a unique rational expectations equilibrium (REE) in which the variables z ,  = 
( y,, i,, m, - p, ,  ApJ are forever bounded.’” In this equilibrium, 
8. The assumption that 6 < 1 in this model is needed in order for an unexpected permanent 
9. In the specification of aggregate supply, I follow McCallum (1989). 
10. One might wonder why I consider only bounded solutions when I wish to suggest that the 
existence of multiple equilibria indicates a real source of economic instability. I regard equations 
(4) and ( 5 )  as log-linear approximations to some exact structural relations, whose approximation 
is accurate only as long as the variables z, remain sufficiently close to their steady-state values. 
Hence explosive solutions to (4) and ( 5 )  need not even approximate solutions to the exact structural 
relations. Furthermore, there may be additional requirements for equilibrium besides the relations 
that (4) and ( 5 )  approximate that are satisfied by all solutions in which the values of the variables 
z ,  do not leave a certain region, but need not be satisfied more generally. For example, when the 
liquidity-preference relation (approximated by [4]) is derived from a Sidrauski-Brock model of 
money demand, there is also a transversality condition that must be satisfied in equilibrium. Dis- 
cussion of whether additional solutions have any economic meaning in the present case would 
thus require that more explicit foundations for equations ( 4 H 6 )  be provided. Nonetheless, consid- 
eration of the nonexplosive solutions alone should suffice to show that alternative policy rules can 
have very different consequences for the determinacy of equilibrium. 
For examples of analyses of how the uniqueness of rational expectations equilibrium depends 
upon the monetary policy rule, in the context of explicit general equilibrium models and with 
consideration of the complete set of equilibria, see Smith (1994) and Woodford (1994). 
increase in the money supply to result in a temporary decrease in the nominal interest rate. 
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Note that an innovation A E ~ ,  < 0 results in a temporary increase in output (one 
period only), a temporary decline in the nominal interest rate (also one period 
only), and a permanent increase in the price level (after a one-period lag). Thus 
the shocks to money demand, not accommodated by any change in money 
supply, produce fluctuations in both economic activity and in the price level. 
Hence a policy of targeting the money supply might be judged undesirable. 
Now suppose that the monetary authority, observing the fluctuations that 
occur under the constant money supply policy, seeks an indicator of the shocks 
that can be used to reduce the volatility of both output and inflation. The price 
level itself is not the best indicator, for it responds to the shock with only a 
one-period lag. (Of course the monetary authority does not know this unless it 
knows the structural model set out above; but it can observe that using other 
variables price-level variations can be forecasted earlier than they can be using 
only the price level itself.) If output is not observed immediately (and this is 
probably realistic) it also may not be the best indicator. The nominal interest 
rate reflects the shock immediately, and this variable is easy to monitor in prac- 
tice, so that it would seem to be the most promising indicator. 
This might suggest a policy of expanding the money supply whenever the 
nominal interest rate rises above its steady-state level, to offset the increase in 
money demand that one infers to have occurred. A well-known problem with 
this proposal, of course, is that nominal interest rates can also be high because 
of expected inflation; so there is the danger of expectations of inflation being 
self-fulfilling because they raise nominal interest rates and so bring about the 
money growth that in turn brings about the inflation. This is the reason for an 
interest instead in interest-rate spreads of various sorts. Let there be observed 
as well a two-period nominal interest rate, that I denote i2,, and let it be related 
to the single-period rate in the way indicated by the expectations theory of the 
term structure, that is, 
1 1  
i,, = -if + -E,ir+,. 
2 2  
If we define the spread as s, = it - i2,, we obtain 
1 
S, = --E,(Ai,+,) 
2 
(7) 
to complete our model. Note that in the equilibrium for the case of a constant 
money supply, 
so that the spread is also an indicator of the current money demand shock, 
and like the single-period interest rate it should be observed by the monetary 
authority almost immediately. 
108 Michael Woodford 
This may suggest the desirability of a feedback rule for monetary policy of 
the form 
Aml = AsI, 
for some A > 0, so that the money supply is permanently increased whenever 
the term structure spread indicates that an increase in money demand has oc- 
curred. Note that according to our model, if a permanent increase in the money 
supply of the right size can be arranged each time such a shock occurs, there 
will never be any variations in either output or in the price level. Furthermore, 
the monetary authority might be led to consider such a response, even in the 
absence of knowledge of the structural model, based upon a comparison of the 
observed consequences of a temporary increase in the spread (in the absence 
of any change in the money supply) with the consequences of an increase in 
the money supply (assuming that independent stochastic variations in the 
money supply have also been observed). 
In fact, one nonexplosive REE that always exists in the case of a policy of 
the form (8) is an equilibrium similar to the one described above, but one in 
which the amplitude of the fluctuations in prices and in output is reduced. In 
this equilibrium, 
PI = -(YEmr-I 
m, = (1 - (Y)E,, 
where now 
2(6 + Y) 
~~~ 
2(6 + Y) + X ( l  - 6)' 
Note that this implies that 0 < (Y < 1 for any X > 0. Hence the fluctuations in 
both output and prices are reduced in amplitude. But one should also note that 
for no value of X are they completely eliminated. This is another example of 
the problem discussed earlier, in which the use of the indicator to stabilize 
reduces its information content. (Note that the response of s, to AE,,,, is propor- 
tional to (Y as well.) 
The fluctuations can nonetheless be very greatly reduced in amplitude (in 
this particular equilibrium) by choosing A to be sufficiently large. But this 
creates another problem. As long as A < 2( 1 + y), one can show that the above 
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solution is the unique REE in which the variables z ,  are forever bounded. But 
if the monetary authority chooses a value A > 2(1 + y), there exists a very 
large multiplicity of nonexplosive REE. These include both “sunspot” equilib- 
ria, in which prices and output fluctuate in response to random events that do 
not affect any of the equilibrium conditions (4)-(7), and equilibria in which 
there is no effect of such events, but the response to money demand shocks is 
different from that described above. The fluctuations in output and inflation 
associated with these other equilibria can be arbitrarily large (whether they 
involve “sunspot” effects or not). Hence the choice of a large value of A need 
not succeed in stabilizing either output or prices.” 
I will not describe in detail the additional equilibria, but I wish to at least 
indicate why the multiplicity arises only in the case of large values of A. Taking 
the expectations of (4) and ( 5 )  conditional upon information at date t - 1, and 
using (6)  and the fact that E,, is a random walk, yields 
(9) 
(10) E,-Ii1 = Er-I(P1+l - P I ) $  
E,-,(m, - P J  = -YE,-&, + Em, 
If we consider the equation corresponding to (4) at date t + I ,  similarly take 
its expectation condition upon date t - 1 information, and subtract this from 
(9), we obtain 
E,-,(Am,+l - AP,,, + ?%+I) = 0. 
E,-l(Amr+, - i, + yAi,,,) = 0. 
Using (lo), this becomes 
Then substituting (8) and using (7), we obtain 
(11) Er-I(A(LYl+2) = 0, 
where 
A(L) = A - (A + 2y)L + 2(1 + y)L2. 
The uniqueness of bounded equilibrium then depends upon the roots of 
A(L),  for reasons of the sort developed in Blanchard and Kahn (1980). If A < 
2( 1 + y), A(L) has both roots inside the unit circle, and so (1 1) is satisfied only 
if EI-,i,  = 0. In this case, it follows from (10) that E,- ,  Apt+, = 0. Furthermore, 
(7) then implies that E,-,s, = 0, and (8) that Er-l Am, = 0. From these results 
one then easily shows that the equilibrium described above is the only one. On 
the other hand, if A > 2( 1 + y), A(L) has both roots outside the unit circle, and 
11. Because the equilibrium conditions (4t (7)  are linear, a linear combination of any two solu- 
tions (with weights summing to one, but not necessarily both positive) is also a solution. So once 
we know that there exist at least two distinct solutions, we know that there exist solutions in which 
the amplitude of fluctuations is arbitrarily large. 
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there are many bounded solutions to (11). To these there then correspond a 
multiplicity of equilibria for the model. 
Figure 3.1 gives an example of how expectations of inflation can be self- 
fulfilling when A is sufficiently large. The plots represent a possible perfect 
foresight equilibrium in the case of no shocks to money demand, and given a 
predetermined initial price level p ,  = 0, for parameter values y = 1, 8 = 0.5, 
X = 10. In the absence of money demand shocks, one possible equilibrium is 
for m,, pr, y,, and i, to equal zero forever; this is the equilibrium described 
previously. In the equilibrium shown in the figure, instead, the price level 
steadily rises after date 1, asymptotically approaching a higher level. This ex- 
pected inflation causes nominal interest rates to rise above their steady-state 
level at date 2 and thereafter, falling back to the steady-state level as inflation 
returns to zero asymptotically. (Note that [ 101 implies that there cannot be any 
deviation of ex ante real rates from the steady-state level that is anticipated a 
period or more in advance.) During these periods, there is an inverted yield 
curve (as interest rates are expected to decline), and this positive spread trig- 
gers money growth, bringing about the inflation as expected. The fact that this 
is expected to occur beginning at date 2, in turn, makes the two-period interest 
rate already high at date 1. This results in a negative spread at date 1, leading 
to contraction of the money supply for one period only, as a result of which 
single-period interest rates are also above their steady-state level at date 1. 
Expectations may switch from the zero-inflation path to this one at date 1 (after 
p ,  has already been fixed) as a result of an arbitrary random event; and a sta- 
tionary “sunspot equilibrium” may be constructed as a stochastic process in 
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which events of this kind occur each period, in each case triggering a dynamic 
response of the kind shown in the figure.’* 
It is also worthwhile to consider briefly the policy rules that become possible 
if aggregate output y, is also observed at date t .  Note that, under the constant 
money supply policy, y, and s, would be observed to always move together, 
so that the two variables would have identical power in inflation forecasting 
regressions. Thus it might seem that a policy of the form 
(12) Amr = -Ay, 
for some A > 0 should have no advantages over one of the form (8). And in 
fact, a policy of the form (12) can support the equilibrium previously described 
for policy (S), although (Y is now given by 
S + Y  
a=------------ - 
6 + y + 6(1 + y)A’ 
But with the policy rule (12), this is the unique nonexplosive FEE, no matter 
how large A is. Hence it is possible (by choosing A > 0 large) to reduce the 
fluctuations in output and inflation to any desired degree, without creating the 
possibility of self-fulfilling expectations. 
The advantage of real activity y, as an indicator is that it indicates the occur- 
rence of a money demand shock for a different reason than do financial vari- 
ables such as s,. When output deviates from its “natural” level, this indicates 
that current aggregate demand has deviated from the level it was expected to 
have when prices were set. The change in the indicator thus represents a rela- 
tively direct effect of the shock itself, rather than an indication of the existence 
of expectations of future inflation. Indeed, an “output gap” can be taken to 
directly indicate a condition that will cause inflation in the future if a change 
in demand conditions does not occur in the meantime, insofar as it indicates 
an existing discrepancy between current prices and/or wages and those that the 
contracting parties would have wished to choose ex post. Because the indicator 
is not valuable solely due to its sensitivity to expectations, policy can be based 
upon it without creating the sort of feedback loop that allows expectations to 
be self-fulfilling. (For the same reason, policy can be based upon it without the 
use of the variable as a basis for policy rendering it useless as an indicator of 
inflationary pressures.) But this sort of difference between the two possible 
indicators cannot be revealed by a consideration of inflation forecasting regres- 
sions alone. 
12. In a sunspot equilibrium made up of repeated fluctuations of this particular kind, there are 
no deviations of output from its “natural” level. But this is only because of the particular example 
of self-fulfilling expectations that I have chosen to exhibit. There also exist sunspot equilibria in 
which arbitrary changes in expectations cause fluctuations in output, and these can be of arbitrarily 
large magnitude. 
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3.5 Conclusions 
All of these considerations point in the same direction: one cannot conclude 
too much about the desirability of alternative indicators without analyzing the 
effects of proposed operating procedures for monetary policy in the context of 
a structural model. I have not attempted here to provide an evaluation of spe- 
cific proposed rules for monetary policy, or even of the usefulness of specific 
proposed indicators. This would require an analysis of the effects of candidate 
policies in the context of a structural model, which I have not undertaken in 
anything more than an illustrative way. 
I have suggested, however, that there are general grounds for skepticism 
about a general approach to monetary policy that would advocate responding 
to variables because they have served in the past to forecast inflation, without 
regard to whether they forecast inflation because they represent (or are directly 
affected by) proximate causes of inflation, or because they indicate the infla- 
tionary expectations of other economic agents. The analysis above suggests 
important advantages to finding indicators of the causes of inflation rather than 
of inflationary expectations. What these variables would be depends upon 
one’s model of the inflationary process. Various measures of the money supply 
can certainly be argued for on these grounds, but one cannot say on the basis 
of economic theory that these are the only such indicators or even the best 
ones. The evidence for recent instability of money demand certainly suggests 
the desirability of finding other indicators as well. In the simple model ana- 
lyzed in section 3.3, the “output gap” can be a more useful indicator of infla- 
tionary pressure than the money supply. Whether it is in practice depends upon 
the details of an empirically adequate structural model of the sources of aggre- 
gate fluctuations and of the nature of aggregate supply and price-setting. 
At this point it might be asked what sort of “structural model” I have in 
mind. Presumably one of the main reasons that policy evaluation on the basis 
of dynamic simulations of complete macroeconomic models is not practiced 
as much now as twenty years ago is that nowadays there is little agreement 
about the type of model that should be used for such a purpose. Fischer (1991) 
attributes this paralysis to the Lucas (1976) critique of econometric policy 
evaluation. 
But the evaluation of policy is still one of our most important tasks. This 
volume shows that interest in that task is far from extinct, even among aca- 
demic economists. The impression I get from some of the papers in this vol- 
ume, however, is that it is hoped that the evaluation of policy in the context of 
econometric models that do not even pretend to be structural can somehow 
sidestep the difficult business of justifying a structural model. This is an odd 
response to Lucas’s article. His point, after all, was that when a model is used 
to predict the consequences of adopting a new policy rule, it is important that 
one believe the model’s equations to be structural (in the sense of continuing 
to hold if a policy change of the kind being considered were made). It is hard 
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to see why the potential pitfalls in reasoning that he warns of should be avoided 
by resorting to econometric specifications that make even less claim to repre- 
senting structural relations than did the consumption function or the Phillips 
curve that Lucas discusses. Perhaps the implicit argument is that, as virtue has 
been shown to be impossible, vice no longer requires an apology. 
I do not see any reason to accept such a nihilistic view. Of course, certainty 
is impossible as to the true structural relations, and the claims we can make 
about the consequences of adopting one policy or another must be qualified on 
this account. But this is no reason not to attempt an analysis. Criticisms of 
analyses as being based upon relations that may not truly be structural need 
not be answered unless the critic proposes an alternative specification that is 
argued to be more accurate and the critic furthermore can show that under the 
alternative specification the answer reached would be quite different. Lucas 
provides examples of criticisms of that sort, but these are not criticisms that 
lead to nihilism; one has a specific alternative to consider, and the justification 
for the change and its quantitative significance can be discussed in the light of 
available evidence. Agreement may be difficult to reach (for the facts seldom 
speak unambiguously), but productive discussion is possible once there are 
clearly posed alternative models to confront. 
There is also some wisdom in the method followed by Bennett McCallum 
(1990), in which the effects of a proposed rule are simulated under several 
different specifications of the basic structural relations. The point of this, I 
think, is not that one can often hope that different specifications will make no 
important difference for the effects of a proposed policy change. But it is 
surely important to know which differences in specification make a crucial 
difference for the predicted outcome of a particular policy experiment, so that 
one can then search for evidence that bears upon the adequacy of one or an- 
other model in this particular respect. 
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